We often explain our actions by saying something like, “I wanted to,” or “It made her happy and that made me feel good,” or “I enjoyed doing it,” or “It helped me get what I wanted.” Acting on technical imperatives or counsels of prudence can always be explained by citing the desires and inclinations on which we have acted. However, Kant holds that moral motivation is correctly represented only by saying, “I did it because it was my duty.” When contrasted with prudential motivation, there seems to be something lacking in the motive of dutifulness.

Moral interest

Some contemporary philosophers have argued that it does not make sense to ask, Why should a person do his or her duty? They maintain that the answer is already given in the question: A person should do his or her duty because it is his or her duty. But within the framework of Kant's moral theory, even when we know what our duty is and that it is our duty, we can still reasonably ask, But why should anyone care about doing his or her duty? Since dutifulness may require us to set aside considerations of our own happiness and welfare, it does seem to make sense to ask what can possibly interest us in acting dutifully. Put in terms of Kant's analysis of moral reasoning, what can bridge the distance between the cognitive and the conative functions of pure practical reason?