Introduction

The India–Pakistan rivalry has been punctuated by recurring militarized crises, four of which have resulted in wars. The enormous costs of this dysfunctional relationship have been obvious since the blood-letting that accompanied partition; today there is the added risk of a nuclear catastrophe. Why cannot the two sides learn to manage their disputes without the risk of war? Will they ever be able to transform their relationship from a competition to achieve relative gains to obtain the absolute gains of peace? Learning, whether functional or dysfunctional, lies at the heart of the answers to these questions. This chapter examines what the parties have learned and have failed to learn over the course of the rivalry. Then it concludes with some thoughts on the requirements for building a more peaceful relationship.

The evidence indicates that, insofar as the peaceful management of disputes and progress toward the termination of the rivalry are concerned, the lessons drawn by both sides have been largely dysfunctional. Experiential learning that has occurred during the course of the rivalry most often has reinforced behavior that has encouraged the recurrence of crises and wars. Vicarious learning from the Soviet–American rivalry regarding the avoidance of nuclear war may prove to be an exception. At first glance, the Kargil crisis and war of 1999, and the border crisis of 2001–02, suggest otherwise.