AN OVERVIEW

Agriculture has consistently been a central focus of the New Order's development strategies and priorities. Although this sector suffered less from the ravages of the Sukarno era than other, more monetized and urban-based components of the economy, agricultural performance in the period before 1966 was hardly impressive. Indonesia had been slow to exploit the then emerging opportunities from the new high-yielding varieties known as the green revolution, partly because modem sector commercial inputs were not readily available. Its once dynamic and efficient cash crop sector was stagnating in the face of neglect and a totally unrealistic exchange rate regime. More generally, rural markets were unable to function effectively owing to the deteriorating state of infrastructure and a plethora of unrealistic government pricing and output regulations. Reflecting the collapse of exports and indifferent food crop performance, moreover, nutritional standards were stagnant at best, and probably declining, in the early 1960s.

In important respects, the rice sector became the barometer of the new regime's success, at least in the first decade after 1966. Rice loomed large in the traditionally dominant]avanese heartland. In the late 1960s, when the government's grip on power was still rather precarious, the price and availability of rice had an important bearing on political stability. Even as late as 1972–73, when President Soeharto was immeasurably more powerful, a rice crisis in the form of sharply escalating prices shook the regime.