Although infant differential responsiveness to people and objects and their relatively advanced social relationships lend credence to the idea that infants have developed a concept of people, an important feature of a concept of a person is that it is distinguished from the self. “One's concept of self is a concept of a person; one's concept of persons cannot be a concept applicable only to a single individual (one-self), for the reason that in this case it would no longer constitute a concept” (Hobson, 1990, p. 165).

The ability to identify with others and to distinguish between self and other plays an important role in inter-subjective relationships. Human adaptation involves an understanding of others, but also an understanding of the self as different from others. Indeed, the self cannot be viewed in isolation from our view of others, but relies deeply on how we represent people. Thus the self is perceived in relation to the other (Fogel, 1993). As discussed in chapter 3, the “other” can of course be the physical as well as the social environment. Infants discriminate between self and inanimate agents, and between the self and the other person. The development of a concept of self is seen as a pivotal aspect of social development, and is an important and necessary condition in the identification of others and self as social.