If one imagines in a thought experiment that science could or should serve as the model for democratic governance, two basic possibilities open up that may serve such a societal function of the scientific community. On the one hand, and as John Dewey anticipates, the hope would be that the fruits of science might be a motor for advancing democratization based on the persuasive and exemplary forms of the rational knowledge science generates and its successive, broad dissemination throughout society. Similarly, Daniel Lerner assigns to the (social) sciences an “emancipatory” role in society. Social science knowledge is seen to broaden, not restrict, the field of free choice open to the members of society. More specifically, the social sciences offer views of the range of possible courses of action by clarifying available rational alternatives in an objective manner.

On the other hand, the alternative perspective stresses the exemplary nature of the scientific community as a democratic organization that serves as a model for societal governance – based also on the idea that science and democracy share specific epistemological commitments (see Dahrendorf, [1963] 1968:254–255). Robert K. Merton's ethos of science, which I will explicate in this section, refers to exactly this nexus between morality and the benefits of scientific work that offers itself as an ideal for the choice of the desired form of governance.

In the first case, and in the end, society's citizens literally become model scientists and carriers of scientific knowledge that throughout society has managed to displace all other, inferior – that is, traditional and everyday forms – of knowledge. But there is also a possible downside: The prospect of the excessive dependence of society and politics on scientific knowledge can seriously undermine the liberty of individuals and their ability to participate in democratic governance and effectively control the conduct of the state apparatus.