The collapse of the Soviet Union was widely welcomed in the West as a clear sign that democracy and capitalism had “won.” For scholars and policy makers alike, it presented a long-awaited opportunity for the peoples of this once vast multinational state to embark on a more desirable path of political and economic development. As part of the euphoria surrounding the recent “third wave” of democratization, the rejection of the Soviet system in favor of Western political and economic institutions was thus expected, and indeed, seemed certain. Yet, a decade after the Soviet Union's celebrated demise, the transitions across its successor states have failed to produce institutional forms that are consistent with these expectations. Throughout the former Soviet Union, there are countless examples of presidents who rule by decree; elections that fail to meet international standards of competitiveness and transparency; and privatized enterprises that continue to receive state subsidies as well as directives.

The conventional wisdom led us to expect a decisive break with the Soviet past in the newly independent Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, both scholars and policy makers predicted the rejection of Soviet institutions throughout Central Asia, either through the reemergence of pre-Soviet tribal divisions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism; the violent outbreak of nationalism and ethnic conflict; or the adoption of democratic and market-oriented reforms.