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  3. The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina
  • Cited by 89
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
March 2011
Print publication year:
2007
Online ISBN:
9780511818219
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818219
Series:
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Subjects:
Area Studies, Latin American Studies, Political Economy, Politics and International Relations, Latin American Government, Politics and Policy, Comparative Politics
Information

Book description

This book develops a general model of public policymaking, focusing on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. By using this model the authors are able to derive a series of empirical propositions about the conditions under which policies are likely to be volatile, rigid, or high quality. In addition, the authors combine the tools of game theory with Williamson's transaction cost theory, North's institutional arguments, and contract theory, to provide a general theory of public policymaking in a comparative political economy setting. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina, using statistical analyses on newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions, rules, incentives and outcomes. Drawing on this research the book explores the reasons for Argentina's seeming inability to design and implement high quality public policies over a sustained period of time.

Reviews

' … this detailed country case study warns against naively technocratic approaches to policy and institutional reforms. Students of political economy, public policy and development studies will benefit immensely from this book … this books is bound to serve as an exemplar for a systematic and integrated study of public policy making in a comparative political economy setting.'

Source: Development and Change

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Contents

Contents
References
References
References
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