I started this book by asking questions about the scope of justice. Are there any requirements of distributive justice applying globally? If so, are these the same requirements as those that apply domestically, or different? I will approach these questions about the scope of justice first by discussing the ground of justice, evaluating positions about morally relevant features necessary to give rise to requirements of justice. This chapter critically evaluates a family of positions that highlight the normative significance of the special relationship between fellow nationals. They hold that relatively demanding requirements of socio-economic justice apply only among fellow nationals by virtue of the special relationship they stand in with one another. Nationalists make two different kinds of claim. Some nationalists argue that there are no distributive requirements that apply outside national communities. Others claim that, even if there might be international distributive requirements, these are significantly weaker and different in kind than requirements of distributive justice that apply only among fellow nationals. This position can be summed up in the thesis that fellow nationals take priority. What is common to both claims is that they regard international distributive requirements as substantially different from what we owe to our fellow nationals. Nationalists draw a stark contrast between principles of justice regulating the national domain and principles for regulating international affairs, and claim that the former demand substantially more from us than the latter.