Having reviewed political theories of justice, I shall now turn to another representative of relational theories denying the existence of global requirements of egalitarian justice. Just like the political conception of justice, this view regards the political institutions of nation-states as necessary to generate egalitarian requirements. Unlike the political conception, however, the position reviewed in this chapter emphasises other features of political institutions besides their coercive exercise of power over citizens and citizens' collective authorisation of political coercion. I focus on the work of John Rawls who laid out a very influential position on domestic distributive justice but who, in subsequent work, denied the existence of requirements of egalitarian distributive justice at the global level. I begin by outlining some main elements of the egalitarian theory of justice set forth by Rawls. I describe the problem of social justice as Rawls understands it, and on the conditions necessary for grounding requirements of justice in the Rawlsian theory. I then proceed by presenting Rawls's views about the nature and justification of principles for regulating the conduct of international affairs as developed in his The Law of Peoples, focusing on some of his major objections to global requirements of distributive justice. Having done so, I argue against Rawls's reasons for rejecting the demand for international distributive justice by pointing out their lack of factual support and inconsistency with the main tenets of the liberal egalitarian theory of justice Rawls defends in his earlier work.