A technology company must have its patent strategy, to paraphrase H. L. Mencken, as a dog must have his fleas. (Mencken was speaking of professors and their theories, but any theorist worth his fleas will doubtless sport a few patents as well.) The truth, however, is that few companies develop IP strategies that are business driven and responsive to changing circumstances; most, instead, indulge in guesswork and fall victim to inertia.

The consequences of pursuing IP without a strategy are predictable enough. Patents make expensive wallpaper. A portfolio that grows haphazardly will ultimately diverge from what is important to business success, covering the past rather than the future and inflicting no pain on competitors. What appears formidable in terms of numbers of patents or their cost may be no more than strategically useless decoration.

How to achieve this unhappy state of affairs? One excellent way is to view IP procurement as a scientific enterprise rather than a business function. Top managers may be tempted to cede full responsibility for IP to the chief technology officer or, worse, to fragmented groups of engineers, each operating with its own budget and discretion. The approach seems superficially sensible, since those others know about patents and technology, and lord knows the managers already have their hands full. But scientists often pursue the intriguing rather than what is important – that latest technological twist may engender appreciative oohs and ahs but no business benefits realizable through IP.