National-intelligence services, in the United States and elsewhere, had not digested the implications of the end of the Cold War when the first wave of terrorist attacks struck: September 11, 2001, in the United States; March 11, 2004, in Spain; and July 7, 2005, in Britain – dubbed “9/11,” “3/11,” and “7/7.” They had not absorbed the effect of one major change when they were hit by yet another. Thus, intelligence is being reshaped under this onrush of events. Especially in the United States, it is also being reshaped under the looming shadow of acrimony about emotional issues at the edge of intelligence, issues with epithets like “Guantanamo” and “Abu Ghraib” and “torture.” These epithets with their implications for intelligence are considered in Chapter 9. The onset of an age of terror has highlighted the role of intelligence services in detecting and preventing possible terrorist acts. At the same time, a series of investigations, especially in the United States and Britain, has focused attention on the performance of those intelligence services. If and when the next major attack comes, recriminations about why it was not prevented will make the post–September 11 debate look decorous.

This book begins with where intelligence has been – the legacy of institutions and operating practices inherited from the Cold War – but its purpose is to describe where intelligence needs to go. The required reshaping is dramatic.