Sharett's promise of cooperation to the UN General Assembly was short-lived. On neither the issue of Jerusalem nor the issue of repatriation would Israel conform its policy to what the United Nations deemed necessary. It did admit a small number of refugees through a family reunification program, but at the same time it generated new refugees. In the latter part of 1949 and into 1950, the IDF expelled inhabitants from villages where they had remained during the offensives of 1948 of the Zionist militias. When able to identify Arabs who had reentered clandestinely, it expelled them – in some cases large groups. In the Galilee, it collected Arab males who had been displaced internally, forced them into trucks and drove them across the frontier. The IDF expelled in particular from areas near the armistice lines, rationalizing these expulsions on security grounds. In other instances the stated rationale was to make room for arriving Jewish immigrants. Neither of these explanations would have justified the expulsions. The 1948 expulsions Eban and Sharett had tried to attribute to wartime conditions. But the new expulsions were being carried out in the absence of hostilities.

The United States pressed Israel on repatriation. Truman continued to call Israel out – in private – for its refusal to repatriate. Just two weeks after the admission vote, Truman sent a pointed message to Ben Gurion, threatening repercussions. “If the Govt of Israel continues to reject the basic principles set forth by the res of the GA of Dec 11, 1948,” Truman said in a cable to Ben Gurion, “the US Govt will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable.” Instead of offering concessions, Ben Gurion mounted a counter-attack. In a message to the United States, Ben Gurion said that as long as the Arab states refused to make peace, “refugees are potential enemies of Israel.” He characterized the refugees as “members of an aggressor-group defeated in a war of its own making. History,” he said, “does not record any case of large-scale repatriation after such experience.” This language suggested permanent rejection of repatriation. Ben Gurion convinced James McDonald, the US ambassador, to ask Truman to back off. McDonald did cable Truman, suggesting that “further US views not be expressed in terms of imperatives.”