Not many international institutional environments can match the density or robustness of collective decision-making norms found in the European Union (EU). But there are surprisingly few empirical studies of how these collective norms operate in the EU. There is an even greater shortfall of research on the effects of this institutional environment on the basic actor properties of the national officials who participate in this system. How does the culture of decision making in the EU affect agents and their bargaining behavior? This article focuses on the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), a Brussels institution responsible for preparing upcoming ministerial meetings of the Council, and, as such, the heart of “everyday” EU decision making. The members of COREPER, known as the EU permanent representatives, are exemplars of “state agents” given their prominence in articulating, arguing, and defending national interests across the gamut of EU affairs. COREPER is thus a key laboratory to test whether and how state agents become socialized into a Brussels-based culture of EU decision making.

COREPER is the main preparatory body for the Council of the European Union, the legislative heart and unabashed defender of national interests in the EU. Composed of senior civil servants and career diplomats, COREPER members meet weekly and have evolved a style of decision making that is rooted in a collective culture with its own informal norms, rules, and discourse.