A good historical account seeks to make out the big picture from small facts. Reviews of a given interpretation therefore range from grand theoretical critiques to picking the smallest nits, often at the same time. When provided with not one but three meticulous chapters, commentary becomes an even greater challenge in each regard.

No big picture at first seems clear and not just because here are three separate treatments of three discrete aspects of the Supreme Court's use of international law. More importantly, the post–World War II era appears to stand in stark contrast to a period such as the Founding. It seems fairly apparent that, at the Founding, doctrine followed the reality that the United States was a small, fledging Republic seeking the protection of the law of nations. By contrast, doctrine in the postwar period seems at times internationalist and at times nationalistic within all three categories: treaties, custom, and interpretation.

The disarray seems all the more odd given what should have happened. No more obvious development in foreign affairs characterized the era than the United States' emergence as the preeminent superpower, rivaled only by the Soviet Union. It would follow that, just as the new Republic embraced international law in its infancy, the new hegemon would ignore it in its maturity. The main likely exception would be those instances when international law facilitated rather than obstructed U.S. foreign policy goals.