Introduction

The first part of this chapter sets the scene by describing the role of external intervention in Afghanistan post-2001. Intervention consists of international liberal and security interventionist policies. The liberal peace thesis was dictated by COIN and short-term peace to pursue US foreign policy and coalition support of eradicating the Taliban from power. It is argued that the trade-off as part of political bargaining has resulted in Northern Alliance warlords and parliamentarians reaping parts of state resources, jobs and economic benefits. Hence, security and liberal peace ideals have enhanced systemic forms of corruption and patronage. Institutionalised corruption has permeated the major institutions of the state, including the police. The next section discusses institutional legacy, which covers the structural conditions of corruption within the police sector. This subsequently discusses what negative impacts corruption has had in the context of Afghan society and the police sector.

Statebuilding, liberal peace and counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan

After the Taliban were forcibly removed, the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (hereinafter the Bonn Agreement) was signed on 5 December 2001. This Agreement precipitated political bargaining with warlords and Northern Alliance militia entering Karzai's cabinet as part of the political process. The political bargaining with warlords assisted the coalition military COIN to fight the Taliban and further seek political economies beyond Kabul. The role of warlords in post-2001 consisted of experienced and locally respected figures who were instrumental in the fight against the Soviet regime and against the Taliban, and such a role evolved into strongman governance. This was as a result of the Karzai regime working with several warlords in the countryside as part of a security pact (Mukhopadhyay, 2014: 1). This informal base of security and provincial governance has hindered formal statebuilding by including lawless warlords into a political system based on clientelism. The inclusion of warlords into the cabinet and governors of provinces has been criticised due to their involvement in previous human rights violations and their failure to govern during the 1990s was criticised by international observers and competing Afghan elites.