We have seen that Model 1 failed to become an alternative model of an ideal government in Indonesia. The model' vision of the state-religion relationship is not applicable to the Indonesian pluralist community. Mohammad Natsir' and Zainal Abidin Ahmad' view of equality and of minority political rights is not conducive to a democratic state, which requires complete equality for all citizens. Model 1 is likely to be suitable only for a Muslim majority with a homogeneous understanding of Islam, and with a minority which is ready to live with such an understanding. In reality, such a condition is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to find.

The next two models which I will discuss in this chapter and the next are immediate responses to the prevailing failed model. Both models agree on the importance of equality as the basic principle of political pluralism. However, both differ in their view of the relationship between religion and the state. While one suggests the crucial role of the state in determining people' religious life, the other proposes that the state be neutral. The two models, which I call the “Religious Democratic State” (RDS) and the “Liberal Democratic State” (LDS), emerged at the same time, yet they developed dynamically on different trajectories. While the former was dominant in the Soeharto era and was widely welcomed by most Muslims, the latter remains limited to intellectual discourse, particularly among the younger Muslim generation.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODEL

Generally speaking, Model 2 is an attempt by the younger generation of santri Muslims to justify the model of polity built by the New Order regime. The word “justify” is perhaps not entirely appropriate, since it has a negative connotation. However, it is not entirely inaccurate since many of the exponents of Model 2 were directly or indirectly supporting Soeharto in his project to build a new government. As we will soon see, many exponents of Model 2 joined him in building the country.