Nixon and Kissinger's new world order called for a stable relationship with the Soviet Union. The two were committed to containment but were not adverse to the idea of dialogue, a position that had in part been responsible for the honeymoon with Fulbright. The national security adviser, however, believed that America's strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had steadily deteriorated under Jack Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Implicit in Kissinger's version of detente was “linkage, ” an updated version of the old balance of power approach to international affairs. Instead of negotiating military, economic, and political issues piecemeal with the Soviets, Nixon and Kissinger would demand general settlements, linking problems such as Vietnam and the Middle East with concessions on trade and disarmament. In the area of arms control Kissinger and his boss saw negotiations with the Soviets as a means to extract concessions across a broad range of issues, including Vietnam. As far as the “balance of terror” was concerned, Kissinger, Nixon, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird were committed to establishing American supremacy, which, of course, they saw as the key to maintaining international stability.

In 1966 U.S. intelligence discovered that the Soviet Union was in the research and development stage of a rudimentary antiballistic missile (ABM) system. The ultimate goal of that program was to ring Moscow and other cities with missiles that could destroy incoming enemy missiles and bombers in case of a nuclear attack.