The social contract against disorder and superficial order

Rousseau's political doctrine, in particular his doctrine of the social contract, can be viewed as a quest for a rational solution to the problem of disorder. As I have attempted to show in the second part of this work, the term disorder has three connotations. Disorder occurs when men's station in society is not the one which is appropriate for them. Disorder is also inevitable when men regard each other as rivals in a contest for distinction, pre-eminence and preferment. Finally, disorder exists within the individual when his inner life is controlled by unregulated passions. The moral condition of men who live in a society without order is unenviable and wretched.

Driven by the insatiable desire to gain preferment, they seek happiness which will always remain beyond their reach. A man's desire will always exceed what he is capable of and he can never find the peace and self-discipline which alone can bring happiness. Imagination is for ever pushing back the frontiers of what is thought to be possible and so men are caught up in a quest which allows them no rest.

An earlier version of this book was presented as a doctoral thesis at the European University Institute in Florence. I should like to record, first of all, a very great debt of gratitude to Werner Maihofer, President of the Institute, who supervised my thesis throughout its development and patiently assisted me at every stage of its composition. I also learned much from discussions with Maurice Cranston and Athanasios Moulakis.

My greatest single debt, however, is to Quentin Skinner, who read several drafts of this work while it was still in manuscript and compelled me to a greater understanding of Rousseau's place within the tradition of both classical and modern republicanism. The final version of this work was composed while I was in Cambridge as a Research Fellow of Clare Hall. I would like to thank the President and the Fellows of the College for their generosity in having appointed me to their number. The intellectual atmosphere of the College has provided an ideal environment for the completion of this work.

I would also like to express my very sincerest thanks to Norberto Bobbio for having agreed to be one of my examiners and for his comments on my thesis, which were of great help to me when I came to make the final revisions. My thanks are also due to Salvatore Veca for his invaluable observations on the theoretical problems which I encountered during my research.

Order as ‘degree’ and the place of man in the system of beings

To understand more fully Rousseau's theory of political order, it is first necessary to make a careful analysis of what he means by disorder. This analysis will make it possible to see the problem of inequality in a fresh light. In this connection it will be helpful to focus once more on the idea of order. For Rousseau ‘order’ does not only mean harmony and the mutual support of all the parts for the common good and the preservation of the system to which they belong. The term ‘order’ also connotes ‘degree’, ‘place’, ‘rank’, and lastly the allocation of each part of the whole, whether it be a person or some other sentient being, to a position which is right and fitting. It is precisely in the light of this conception of order that the theory of inequality reveals its various dimensions and its theoretical richness. La Nouvelle Héloise provides a particularly clear example of the relation between ‘order’ and ‘place’. The relevant text is the one where Mme de Wolmar, in the middle of a discussion on the education of children, remarks: ‘Everything happens for the best in the system of the universe. Everyone has his proper place in the ideal order of things; the important thing is to find that place and avoid upsetting that order.’

There is a passage in the Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard where Rousseau uses the terms ‘place’ and ‘rank’ to depict the disorder which rules in human affairs.

Almost everything in Rousseau is the subject of debate. But one of the points which does, probably, command universal agreement is that Rousseau set out to propound a theory of a just political order, or, to use a phrase which reflects his intention, the doctrine of the ‘wellordered society’.

Every political society establishes its own political order, but it is only a political order which satisfies certain moral criteria which may correctly be described as just one. It was precisely because he hoped to define these criteria that Rousseau undertook his study of political systems. For him, order is not, in itself, a primary value; it is the just political order which is the ground of value since it is the necessary condition for the primary values of liberty, virtue and happiness. It is Hobbes, not Rousseau, who can correctly be described as the philosopher of an unqualified political order, and the political philosophy of the Social contract may legitimately be interpreted as the search for a theoretical alternative to the order propounded in Leviathan.

The phrase ‘well-ordered society’, which we find at the beginning of the first version of the Social contract, suggests a society ordered in such a way that men find it in their interest to treat their fellows with justice and consideration – that is to say, to live in harmony.

In this letter to Moultou, Rousseau introduces us directly to the problem of order, one of the most important themes in his thought. In his autobiographical writings, towards the end of his life, Rousseau emphasizes the principles which inspired his thinking about morality and politics.

There is a natural order which comes from God and to this there corresponds a moral order, which also comes from God. In contrast, relations between men are corrupt both in the realm of natural and moral order. Men's lives unfold amidst the turmoil of disordered relationships, which prevent any one of them from living in harmony with his true moral nature and enjoying a state of union with his fellows.

The only hope for man who has sought in vain for love, friendship and fatherland, lies now in the world beyond, to which everything must ‘finally return’. In the metaphysical order, justice will at last be sovereign and virtue will have its reward.

But this is, in a manner of speaking, to start at the end.