Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part I Philosophy of language
- Part II Philosophy of mind
- 5 Intentionality of mind and language
- 6 Network and Background in mental states and language
- 7 Rediscovering the mind
- 8 Cognitive psychology and the unconscious
- Part III Philosophy of society and other matters
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Rediscovering the mind
from Part II - Philosophy of mind
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part I Philosophy of language
- Part II Philosophy of mind
- 5 Intentionality of mind and language
- 6 Network and Background in mental states and language
- 7 Rediscovering the mind
- 8 Cognitive psychology and the unconscious
- Part III Philosophy of society and other matters
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Searle's incredulity
Searle's Intentionality (1983) looks both backward and forward. It looks backward by telling us about language, his old interest. It tells us that Intentionality found in language is derived from Intentionality found in the mind. Humans impose Intentionality on language, but find it naturally in the mind. So Intentionality helps to complete Searle's views in philosophy of language. But it also looks forward in that it anticipates some of the controversial things he says in philosophy of mind in Rediscovery of the Mind (1992a) and in other writings.
It is interesting that Searle does not quite understand what some of these controversies are about. As he sees it in Rediscovery, many of his views in philosophy of mind are so obviously true that it is hard to imagine anyone disputing them. Searle is incredulous about the reactions of some philosophers and scientists to his views concerning four features of the mind. First and foremost among them is his view about the importance of consciousness for the studies of philosophy of mind and psychology. It seems obvious to Searle that conscious mental phenomena such as pains, feelings associated with being touched, visual experiences, beliefs, intentions, various emotional feelings and the like need to be accounted for in these studies (1989a: 193–4). It puzzles him, therefore, when those he labels logical behaviourists seem to deny the importance and even the existence of consciousness.
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- Information
- John Searle , pp. 129 - 148Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2000