Kate Moran considers the attitude that autonomous agents ought to take toward inclination. Kant himself often describes inclination as the antagonist of moral willing and virtuous struggle, even suggesting at one point that "to be entirely free from [inclination] must … be the wish of every rational being" (GMS 4:428). Moran argues that this assertion – and others like it – are often misunderstood as a wholesale indictment of inclination. She offers an analysis of the text that demonstrates that Kant’s concern is not with inclination as such, but with inclination as a source of need and neediness. The chapter continues to consider Kant’s conception of neediness, and his account of the ideal stance toward inclination – something he calls independence. Although independence is an impossible ideal for free, yet sensible, agents, it is nonetheless an informative ideal. In particular, the ideal serves as a standard against which one can measure the ways in which agents fall short of complete independence. Moran offers a sketch of the "moral misery" that agents experience when need gains ascendancy over freedom.