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General Question

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Gary Hatfield
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

We have seen above the vast difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. The possibility of analytic propositions could be comprehended very easily; for it is founded solely upon the principle of contradiction. The possibility of synthetic propositions a posteriori, i.e., of such as are drawn from experience, also requires no special explanation; for experience itself is nothing other than a continual conjoining (synthesis) of perceptions. There remain for us therefore only synthetic propositions a priori, whose possibility must be sought or investigated, since it must rest on principles other than the principle of contradiction.

Here, however, we do not need first to seek the possibility of such propositions, i.e., to ask whether they are possible. For there are plenty of them actually given, and indeed with indisputable certainty, and since the method we are now following is to be analytic, we will consequently start from the position: that such synthetic but pure rational cognition is actual; but we must nonetheless next investigate the ground of this possibility, and ask: how this cognition is possible, so that we put ourselves in a position to determine, from the principles of its possibility, the conditions of its use and the extent and boundaries of the same.

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Chapter
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Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
With Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason
, pp. 27 - 31
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1997

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  • General Question
  • Immanuel Kant
  • Edited by Gary Hatfield, University of Pennsylvania
  • Book: Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164061.009
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  • General Question
  • Immanuel Kant
  • Edited by Gary Hatfield, University of Pennsylvania
  • Book: Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164061.009
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • General Question
  • Immanuel Kant
  • Edited by Gary Hatfield, University of Pennsylvania
  • Book: Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164061.009
Available formats
×