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  • Cited by 2
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
February 2022
Print publication year:
2022
Online ISBN:
9781108754637
Series:
Elements in Ethics

Book description

The Element provides an overview of Immanuel Kant's arguments regarding the content of the moral law (the categorical imperative), as well as an exposition of his arguments for the bindingness of the moral law for rational agents. The Element also considers common objections to Kant's ethics.

References

Kantian Texts and Abbreviations

Volume, page, and line numbers refer to the Academy edition of Kant’s works (Berlin: De Gruyter et al., 1900–). For the most part, translations have been adapted from the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works. English versions of Kant’s writings on moral and political philosophy can be found in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, edited by Gregor, Mary and Wood, Allen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a revised version of Mary Gregor’s translation of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, see the German-English edition edited by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Abbreviations used for Kant’s works, handwritten notes and lectures:

KU

Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790)

KpV

Critique of Practical Reason (1788)

GMS

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)

MS

The Metaphysics of Morals (1797)

R

Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793)

VMo-Collins

Moral Philosophy Lectures Collins (1784–1785)

VMo-Powalski

Practical Philosophy Lectures Powalski (1782–1783)

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