Talk of a “knowledge society” (Nico Stehr) and its corresponding study of “epistemic sociology” (Karin Knorr-Cetina) is diametrically opposed to the spirit of social epistemology. It is no secret that the upbeat character of most discussions of “modernity” and “modernization” have been due to the special status accorded to science and technology. The same applies to discussions of postmodernism, whose roots in the works of Daniel Bell and Jean-François Lyotard in the 1970s are identical to those of the knowledge society. From the standpoint of social epistemology, the postmodern valorization of science and technology (which usually means information technology, that is, the commodification and routinization of scientific knowledge) amounts to little more than confirming normative status on empirical tendencies whose ultimate significance has yet to be fully fathomed. (See information science.)

These tendencies include the increasing percentage of state and corporate budgets devoted to scientific research but more importantly the increasing appeal to scientific concepts and arguments to justify non-scientific beliefs and actions, and the increasing use of science and technology indicators as measures of social and economic superiority in the international arena. At the very least, they bear the imprint of an academic or otherwise intellectual mindset not so different from that of the average knowledge society analyst.