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  1. Home
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  3. Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism
  • Cited by 14
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
October 2013
Print publication year:
2013
Online ISBN:
9781139795401
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139795401
Subjects:
Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
Series:
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Information

Book description

The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

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Contents

Contents
References

References

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