The Japanese plan for the invasion of Papua had a solid strategic foundation and was much more than the opportunistic and rapid dash for Port Moresby it is characterised as being in the Kokoda myth. The opportunism was supposed to have occurred when, after the failure of the sea attack on Port Moresby at the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese suddenly switched to a landward approach whereby the main attack came along the Kokoda Track and was to arrive at Port Moresby at the same time as a secondary amphibious attack launched from Milne Bay. In fact a land approach from the north coast of Papua was always the preferred option. The myth, with its sights firmly on the Kokoda Track, also misses the point that the Japanese were not in Papua just to take Port Moresby. They were there to forestall an Allied offensive by occupying sites of importance regardless of whether or not their assault on Port Moresby went ahead. Japanese strategy in Papua in 1942 was essentially defensive – an Allied counter-offensive was expected from Australia, and Papua was to be seized and the Allied advance halted there. Major bases were to be built in the Buna–Giruwa–Gona area and at Milne Bay, with a lesser base at Kokoda. Port Moresby was a highly desirable, but not essential, part of the plan.