Many of Kuhn’s critics think that Kuhn is the philosopher most responsible for emphasizing the impact of non-cognitive factors in science, and thus threatening the rationality of theory choice (see Lakatos 1970/1972; Laudan 1984; Boghossian 2006). Both the sociologists of science who were inspired by his work and many of his philosophical critics regard Kuhn’s view as a form of constructionism. But as Ian Hacking (1999) notes, “constructionism” connotes different things to different people. Many sociologists and historians of science self-consciously approach their subject as constructionists (see Latour and Woolgar 1986; Shapin 1996, 9–10; Golinski 1988/2005). Many philosophers of science, on the other hand, believe that constructionism entails a pernicious form of relativism (see, for example, Brown 1989, 37; Boghossian 2006, 118–22). Hence, for many philosophers of science calling someone a constructionist amounts to a refutation of their view.

In this chapter, I aim to clarify the relationship between Kuhn’s view of science and constructionism. In clarifying the nature of Kuhn’s constructionism, I also aim to clarify Kuhn’s relationship to both philosophy of science and sociology of science.