Crossref Citations
This Book has been
cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.
Albert, Max
1996.
„Unrealistische Annahmen“ und empirische Prüfung.
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch,
Vol. 116,
Issue. 3,
p.
451.
Anderson, Erik
1997.
DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM: ALIVE AND WELL.
Philosophical Papers,
Vol. 26,
Issue. 2,
p.
195.
Norris, Christopher
1997.
Ontological relativity and meaning‐variance: A critical‐constructive review.
Inquiry,
Vol. 40,
Issue. 2,
p.
139.
Robb, David
1997.
The Properties of Mental Causation.
The Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 47,
Issue. 187,
p.
178.
Halpin, John F.
1998.
Lewis, Thau, and Hall on Chance and the Best-System Account of Law.
Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 65,
Issue. 2,
p.
349.
Roberts, John
1998.
Lewis, Carroll, and seeing through the looking glass.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 76,
Issue. 3,
p.
426.
Lange, Marc
1999.
Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Lawhood.
Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 66,
Issue. 2,
p.
243.
Baker, Alan
1999.
Causation and Laws of Nature.
p.
91.
Ellis, Brian
1999.
Causation and Laws of Nature.
p.
19.
Menzies, Peter
1999.
Causation and Laws of Nature.
p.
313.
Roberts, John
1999.
“Laws of Nature” as an Indexical Term: A Reinterpretation of Lewis's Best-System Analysis.
Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 66,
Issue. S3,
p.
S502.
Roberts, John T.
2001.
Undermining Undermined: Why Humean Supervenience Never Needed to Be Debugged (Even If It's a Necessary Truth).
Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 68,
Issue. S3,
p.
S98.
Hung, Edwin H.-C.
2001.
Kuhnian paradigms as representational spaces: New perspectives on the problems of incommensurability, scientific explanation, and physical necessity.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 15,
Issue. 3,
p.
275.
Ellis, Brian
2002.
Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science.
p.
193.
Jaeger, Lydia
2002.
Humean supervenience and best-system laws.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 16,
Issue. 2,
p.
141.
Craver, Carl F.
2002.
The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science.
p.
55.
Ward, Barry
2003.
Sometimes The World is Not Enough: The Pursuit of Explanatory Laws in a Humean World.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 84,
Issue. 2,
p.
175.
Carroll, John W.
and
Wentz, Lee
2003.
A Puzzle About Persistence.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 33,
Issue. 3,
p.
323.
Bunzl, Martin
2004.
Laws without possibility?.
Philosophia,
Vol. 31,
Issue. 3-4,
p.
475.
Loewer, Barry
2004.
David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance.
Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 71,
Issue. 5,
p.
1115.