Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-cnmwb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-22T02:20:53.728Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Rethinking Judicial Policy Making in a Separation of Powers System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2009

George I. Lovell
Affiliation:
University of Washington
Get access

Summary

There is an old adage that you can kill a person with kindness, and this is equally true when applied to proposed legislation.

AFL President Samuel Gompers, American Federationist, May 1914, 406

In October 1914, the United States Congress passed and President Wilson signed the Clayton Antitrust Act, the first major revision of federal antitrust policy since the Sherman Act of 1890. The Clayton Act was of great interest to labor organizations because it contained provisions that seemed to prohibit federal judges from using injunctions and the antitrust laws to regulate workers and labor unions. Labor organizations had been demanding such legislation for two decades in an effort to limit the power of federal judges, who at that time had assumed much of the responsibility for regulating labor organizations and workers' collective activities.

The Clayton Act appears to be a significant political victory for labor organizations. Passage came two years after the leaders of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) made a controversial decision to endorse Woodrow Wilson's campaign for the presidency. When Wilson signed the new law, AFL president Samuel Gompers announced triumphantly that the endorsement had paid off. Gompers publicly expressed unqualified satisfaction with the labor provisions, telling rank-and-file readers of the AFL's leading publication that the new law was a “Charter of Industrial Freedom,” an “Industrial Magna Carta,” and that the labor provisions contained “sledge-hammer blows to the wrongs and injustice so long inflicted upon the workers.”

Type
Chapter
Information
Legislative Deferrals
Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy
, pp. 1 - 41
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×