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1 - Logical form

Dale Jacquette
Affiliation:
University of Bern
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Summary

CONCEPTS OF LOGIC

If we can explain what logic is, correctly describing in the most general way the nature or concept of logic, then we should have already said enough to understand why logic is important. We may begin, in keeping with customary practice, by saying that logic studies the structural properties of reasoning. Reasoning in turn is an exercise of thought, at least of thoughts considered in the abstract, in which conclusions are drawn inferentially from assumptions.

Assumptions and conclusions, in turn, are propositions. The ontic status of propositions is a frequent subject of philosophical dispute. Propositions can nevertheless be interpreted as sentence tokens or types or the abstract meanings of sentence tokens or types, in which a state of affairs is proposed for consideration, classically as true or false. Logical inference is generally considered to be a syntactical correlation of sentences representing assumptions and conclusions in permissible combinations, or as a semantic relation holding between the possible truth-values of propositions taken respectively as assumptions and conclusions. We may also be able to reason in the sense of drawing inferences from questions and commands, and from direct experiential encounters with the state of the world in the empirical experience of sensation and perception. Logicians have investigated some of these non-propositional formal inferential relations, but the topic has not been widely explored in the philosophical literature.

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Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2010

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  • Logical form
  • Dale Jacquette, University of Bern
  • Book: Logic and How it Gets That Way
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654147.003
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  • Logical form
  • Dale Jacquette, University of Bern
  • Book: Logic and How it Gets That Way
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654147.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Logical form
  • Dale Jacquette, University of Bern
  • Book: Logic and How it Gets That Way
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654147.003
Available formats
×