The men who advised Lyndon Johnson on issues relating to the Middle East perceived three important American interests there. First, the influence of the Soviet Union had to be contained. Second, Israel's right to exist had to be protected. And third, the flow of the region's oil, upon which the industry of the European and Japanese allies of the United States was dependent, had to be maintained. In November 1963, all three fronts were relatively quiet, and the Middle East could not command the attention of senior officials struggling with recurring crises in Vietnam. Only in late May and early June of 1967 did Johnson and his principal aides turn from the torments of southeast Asia to focus their attention on an Arab–Israeli crisis that might have triggered World War III.

The central role in the Middle Eastern drama, from November 1963 to January 1969, was played by Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egyptian president of the United Arab Republic (UAR). Virtually every event of consequence bore his imprint as he rallied Arab masses, manipulated American presidents and Soviet premiers, terrified local potentates, and ranted against Israel. Only in the crisis in Cyprus was he peripheral – and even there his existence increased American anxiety. Important supporting roles were played by Johnson, Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Levi Eshkol, prime minister of Israel, the shah of Iran, and the men in the Kremlin.