THE RETURN OF RATIONALISM

As explained at the end of chapter 3, it could be argued that, if subjectivism is rejected, then there will no longer be any reason to suppose that morality faces a justificatory crisis. I think that this argument is mistaken. I shall argue that, even assuming that McDowell's rejection of subjectivism should be accepted, and assuming that McDowell's model neither assimilates ethical reasons to empirical reasons nor renders them metaphysically weird, he has not thereby shown that the appearance of a justificatory crisis of morality is a mere illusion.

McDowell argues, in my opinion successfully, that the comparison with science does not undermine the idea of supporting an ethical outlook by substantive ethical reasons. However, it seems that the comparison between substantive and rationalistic justifications can present a threat to the soundness of any ethical outlook. There seems to be no guarantee that substantive and rationalistic justifications do not produce conflicting results: a substantive justification might recommend a particular ethical outlook, whereas a rationalistic justification might recommend a conflicting one. In the case of such a conflict, it seems extremely tempting to conclude that favor must be given to the rationalistic justification. By definition, rationalistic justifications start with premises that even a moral skeptic could accept. In other words, they seem to start on a firmer basis than substantive justifications. Obviously, in the extreme case, one can imagine that a rationalistic justification would in fact validate the moral skeptic in her skepticism.