Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Series Editors' Preface
- Preface
- PART I INTRODUCTION
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Duverger's propositions
- PART II STRATEGIC VOTING
- PART III STRATEGIC ENTRY
- PART IV ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL
- PART V COORDINATION FAILURES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE
- PART VI CONCLUSION
- APPENDICES
- References
- Subject Index
- Author Index
1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Series Editors' Preface
- Preface
- PART I INTRODUCTION
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Duverger's propositions
- PART II STRATEGIC VOTING
- PART III STRATEGIC ENTRY
- PART IV ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL
- PART V COORDINATION FAILURES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE
- PART VI CONCLUSION
- APPENDICES
- References
- Subject Index
- Author Index
Summary
Early in the 1984 presidential primary season in the United States, it was clear that the sitting President, Ronald Reagan, would easily win the Republican nomination and that former Vice President Walter F. Mondale was the front-runner for the Democratic nod. Democratic voters who knew that they disliked Mondale faced a coordination problem: If all of them could agree on a single alternative to Mondale, from among the halfdozen or so candidates languishing in single digits in the opinion polls, they could conceivably deny Mondale the nomination; but if they failed to agree on a single alternative, then Mondale would almost surely win. Although anti-Mondale Democrats shared a dislike of Mondale, they differed substantially in their preferred alternative. Thus, even putting aside the complexities of the American primary process, it was by no means clear ex ante that anti-Mondale Democrats could coordinate on an alternative. In the event, although Gary Hart emerged as the focal alternative to Mondale and enjoyed a large and rapid run-up in the polls, his candidacy faltered and Mondale secured the nomination.
Early in the 1990 presidential campaign in Peru, it was clear that Nobel Prize-winning novelist Mario Vargas Llosa was the front-runner. Peruvian voters who knew that they disliked Vargas Llosa faced a coordination problem: If all of them could agree on a single alternative to Vargas Llosa from among the half-dozen or so candidates trailing in the polls, they could conceivably deny Vargas Llosa the presidency; but if they failed to agree on a single alternative, then Vargas Llosa would almost surely win.
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- Making Votes CountStrategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems, pp. 3 - 12Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997