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5 - Vertical dilemmas: Piece-rate incentives and credible commitments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Gary J. Miller
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
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Summary

The important result is the moderate level of reward and compliance in equilibrium, even though both individuals would be better off with a high degree of reward and a high degree of compliance. The Pareto optimal result is not achieved because both superior and subordinate have an incentive to break away from it. The supervisors quite naturally have an incentive to give less than the maximum reward to the subordinates, and the subordinates quite naturally have an incentive to float through their work situation with less than 100 percent effort.

Miller (1977: 50)

While it is necessary to delegate authority to individuals with specialized knowledge, that very delegation opens the door to incoherent organizational action. What is needed, therefore, is an incentive system that will encourage organizational specialists to use their knowledge in the coherent pursuit of organizational goals. An ideal incentive system will overcome information asymmetries and team production externalities, transforming an organizational social dilemma into an organizational “invisible hand.” An incentive system should harness individual self-interest in pursuit of organizational goals.

Most hierarchies make little attempt to use their compensation systems to overcome the temptation of team members to shirk. Only 22 percent of U.S. workers feel that there is a direct connection between their effort and how much they are paid, despite the fact that 61 percent want their pay to be tied to their performance (Lawler 1987: 69–76).

Type
Chapter
Information
Managerial Dilemmas
The Political Economy of Hierarchy
, pp. 102 - 119
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

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