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Epilogue - Panic-less Panics of 1837

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Jessica M. Lepler
Affiliation:
University of New Hampshire
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Summary

Define the Panic of 1837. The most recent editions of textbooks vary in their answers.

Chronology is far from consistent. Dates for the beginning of panic range from “late 1836” through the May 1837 bank suspensions. In some textbooks, there is no panic at all because when Van Buren took office, he “was immediately faced with a catastrophic depression.” Or, as another puts it, “no sooner was Van Buren in office than a severe depression, called the Panic of 1837, struck.” The dates for the end of the Panic of 1837 are equally varied. One text argues, “The panic of 1837 subsided by 1838.” Another asserts, “credit continued to collapse through 1838 and 1839.” A third extends the panic further, echoing generations of political history by claiming, “The Panic of 1837 lasted six long years.”

Finding a uniform answer to the question of the panic’s cause proves equally problematic. Some textbooks clearly blame domestic policies.8 Others cite foreign, especially British, causes. Some textbooks perform intricate narrative maneuvers so that they can blame both foreign and domestic causes. Others end up blaming both without seemingly meaning to do so. For example, one textbook first argues, “the Democrats bore no direct responsibility for the economic downturn”; on the next page, however, this same text claims, “the Specie Circular contributed to the Panic of 1837.” Other textbooks try to avoid this issue by relocating blame to impersonal and ahistorical economic forces. One text employs the adjective “inevitable” to describe the “cycle” in 1837; another describes Jackson’s effect on “the swings of the economic pendulum.”

Type
Chapter
Information
The Many Panics of 1837
People, Politics, and the Creation of a Transatlantic Financial Crisis
, pp. 235 - 254
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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