Maritime Power and the Power of Money in Louis XIV's France Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The funding shortfalls of the first nine years of the Spanish Succession conflict had placed substantial financial pressures on the naval trésoriers, several of whom experienced personal insolvency. Three days before Louis de Lubert died on 8 May 1705 following a stroke, the trésorier's accounts for the exercice of 1704 indicated that he was over-committed to the extent of 1.6 million l. In the weeks after Lubert's death, his widow and the trésorier's heirs, alongside his former principal commis, were confronted by the task of completing his exercice. In less than 26 days, the final payments of nearly 1.3 million l. worth of lettres de change were met, but this caused the deficit in the late trésorier's accounts to rise to almost 3.5 million l. by 31 May 1705. With the crown assigning little importance to resolving the late trésorier's financial problems, Louis de Lubert's son of the same name sought an extraordinary intervention from the finance ministry on 6 September 1706. Lubert wanted to finance his father's debts from 1704 by continuing the practice of revenue anticipation, specifically by drawing on the funds assigned to the forthcoming exercice of 1707. He reasoned to the finance ministry that the level of underfunding that this measure would create for the trésorier on duty in 1707 would force Pontchartrain's hand on the issue of a further round of office creations in the navy. It remains unclear if Pontchartrain eventually gave in to the specific proposals mentioned by Lubert, or whether Chamillart simply went ahead and paid some of Lubert's debts by taking funds nominally allocated to the trésorier in charge of the exercice of 1707. But this attempt to shift responsibility for funding problems onto the naval minister and other trésoriers underscores the extent to which the navy's financial intermediaries and, indeed, the finance ministry could fail to act in the navy's interests. Both the trésoriers’ pursuit of their personal interests and the finance minister's desire to reduce spending commitments, or to offload liabilities whenever practically possible, had disastrous consequences for the viability of the fleet.
Louis XIV's strategic ambitions at sea were inherently limited by the naval trésoriers’ ability to acquit their debts on time.
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- Maritime Power and the Power of Money in Louis XIV's FrancePrivate Finance, the Contractor State, and the French Navy, pp. 228 - 237Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2023