Introduction

The market does not and, as I shall argue in the next chapter, cannot give to work the priority that it merits on the grounds of its hedonic and developmental potentials – but neither does it systematically degrade work. What it does is to award to some the advantages of challenging, self-directed work and to others the disadvantages of routine, closely supervised, and unchallenging work. In this chapter we explore the market's distribution system for these kinds of satisfying and unsatisfying work.

The chapter has four principal sections. First, I ask, Who is likely to pay for improving workplace enjoyment and learning? We will find that the market system allocates costs in such a way as to make almost impossible any provision for workplace learning that does not also improve productivity. The second section treats the contribution of family, technology, and market to the stratification of workplace learning. We will discover that the major proportion of the explanation for stratification lies in family and technological processes, not in the market. In line with the argument of Part V, we construct an alternative stratification hierarchy based on work rather than consumer utilities. Third, analysis of the assignment within firms (internal markets) of opportunities for workplace learning shows again how disadvantageous product competition is to workers. And finally, we find in farm work and housework that these facets of the world we have lost need not be mourned. Together this information should help us answer a modified version of the question that has been said to typify political science: Who gets what features of development through work activities, when, and how?