Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vpsfw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-17T10:19:37.142Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

10 - Cost Savings from Emissions Trading

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 December 2009

A. Denny Ellerman
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Paul L. Joskow
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Richard Schmalensee
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Juan-Pablo Montero
Affiliation:
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
Get access

Summary

COST SAVINGS IS THE GOAL

Emissions trading is advocated as a means for achieving environmental goals because the flexibility it provides to affected sources promises lower costs than do the usual source-specific mandates, standards, and other forms of prescription broadly characterized as “command-and-control” (CAC). With the choices made possible by a market-based emissions control policy, the costs of achieving any given level of environmental protection can be reduced below those incurred by CAC regulation. Alternatively, more environmental protection can be obtained for the same cost.

The magnitude of the cost savings potentially available through use of emissions trading has been the subject of study for a number of years, but the results have varied widely. Estimated ratios of the cost of an observed CAC program to that of a least-cost market-based alternative have ranged from just over 1 to over 20. The implication is that emissions trading could lead to negligible or enormous savings, depending on the costs of the CAC program to which the efficient, market-based alternative is compared. These earlier studies were performed with the considerable handicap of being able only to compare the unappealing, observed reality of CAC programs with simulated and often idealized market-based alternatives. This defect was unavoidable because so few market-based alternatives have been available to observe, and, with one or two exceptions, these few have not been notably successful. Now Title IV provides the opportunity to compare a real, market-based alternative, with all of its inevitable imperfections, with some hypothetical CAC alternative.

Type
Chapter
Information
Markets for Clean Air
The U.S. Acid Rain Program
, pp. 253 - 296
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×