Dean Rusk may have used silence to express his reservations, but other officials would become increasingly vocal throughout 1965 and 1966 in pointing out the pitfalls facing U.S. forces in Vietnam and in criticizing Westmoreland's approach to the war. During that period the three factors that had principally characterized America's problems in Vietnam – the U.S. military's recognition of its foundering position, interservice feuding, and political maneuvering – became more pronounced and showed just how elusive success had become. By late 1966 it was clear that American forces had not been able to reverse conditions on the ground, while military leaders were aware of the limits to be placed on their operations. The services themselves were brawling over MACV strategy, and influential officials were sounding alarms about the U.S. future in Vietnam. Maybe most important, Lyndon Johnson's political career was on the line as the war in Indochina replaced the War on Poverty as the dominant national issue. Although the conflict would continue for many more years, the blueprint for failure had been drawn at the outset of intervention.