Let us pause here and relate more explicitly what Merleau-Ponty says of one's own lived body to Nancy's thought of the body. Both find in the unum quid of the union a description of the body that overcomes the ontological dualism of pure mind and pure matter. Yet there are obvious differences in their thinking of the body. The question is: what do these differences amount to? And more generally for our study: what do they tell us about phenomenology, especially in its Merleau-Pontian transformation? There are many ways in which we could cast the differences between Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's thinking of the body. We could say, for one, that the difference is one of obscurity versus clarity. While Merleau-Ponty's lived body is transparent, expressive, shot through with sense, Nancy's bodies appear to be impenetrable and dense. Of course, it is not unproblematic to qualify the lived body, especially in Merleau-Ponty, as transparent or shot through with sense. After all, Merleau-Ponty ends the first part of the Phenomenology of Perception by reminding us that it is the reflective attitude that ‘purifies simultaneously the common notions of body and of soul’ and ‘establish[es] a clarity within us and outside of us’, whereas ‘the experience of one's own body … reveals to us an ambiguous mode of existence’ (PP, 204). At the same time, the impenetrability or obscurity attributed to Nancy's bodies does not prevent these bodies from making sense; it is rather the condition of their sensing and sense-making. The difference then lies in their respective ways of conceiving of sense and sensing. In what follows, I want to cast this difference in terms of a priority of unity over dislocation, which is also the priority of interiority over exteriority or of the moment of reappropriation and integration over the moment of alienation and separation. In order to clarify how this priority plays out, I propose to go through two main areas of comparison. First I compare the kind of unity attributed to the body schema with Nancy's description of the body as corpus, and second I compare the kind of synthesis experienced in sensing to Nancy's pluralisation of bodies of senses, focusing more specifically on the experience of self-touching.