The papers in this volume extend from my first published paper (Chapter 12) to very recent work. Generally, they are papers in theoretical and applied microeconomics. As in previous volumes (Fisher, 1991, 1992a, 1992b), I have not reprinted papers that have been superseded by my other books.

The chapters of Part I (“Disequilibrium and Stability”), particularly those of Part IA (“Models of Disequilibrium Behavior”), reflect my principal theoretical interest of the 1970s and early 1980s other than as discussed in my book on the subject (Fisher, 1983). In approximately 1970, I became convinced that the single most important lacuna in economic theory is our inability to explain whether or how competitive economies not in general equilibrium succeed in getting there. In part under the (usually) benign influence of Frank Hahn, who visited MIT in 1971, I explored that interest for well over a decade.

I remain convinced that the problem of disequilibrium and stability is one of central importance. Briefly, the elegant nature of the economics of equilibrium, beginning with the analysis of the plans of optimizing agents, has caused economists to concentrate on situations in which those plans are mutually compatible. But the work of the Invisible Hand cannot be understood by looking only at situations in which that work has been completed. Further, the central tenets of Western capitalism as to the desirability of free markets – the relations between competitive equilibrium and Pareto efficiency – become empty propositions if positions of competitive equilibrium cannot be achieved or can be achieved only slowly.