Introduction

Inflow trends and contradictory approaches to management

In the European context, Italy became a country of immigration relatively late. The first positive balance between emigration and immigration (return immigration included) dates to 1973. Inflows started after the oil crisis of 1973, when the United Kingdom, Germany and, in particular, neighbouring France closed their borders to immigrants. Flows were partially diverted towards Southern Europe not only because more attractive receiving countries had introduced zero immigration policies, but also because during the late 1970s and early 1980s, regions of low productivity in Southern European countries started to face a labour shortage (King, Fielding & Black 1997: 13; Morén-Alegret & Ruiz 2007). Furthermore, the previous Italian economic boom, which had reduced the per capita income gap with other European countries, rendered many jobs unattractive for Italian nationals. Lastly, low fertility rates led to an aging population, which, combined with scant social services devoted to elderly care, attracted caregivers from emigration countries (Einaudi 2007). In the mid-1970s, however, Italy was not yet a country of immigration and did not perceive itself as such. Though the 1981 Census revealed an unexpectedly ‘high’ number of foreign residents (210,937), the first big flows occurred later, between 1984 and 1989, when approximately 700,000-800,000 people entered the country. Of these, it is estimated that 300,000-350,000 entered or remained in Italy without a valid residence permit (Mauri & Micheli 1992).

We can thus begin to single out three significant features of immigration in Italy: rapid inflow, substantial volume and a high proportion of undocumented immigrants. These features are also shared by Spain (González Enríquez 2009) and, as far as the high proportion of undocumented immigrants goes, by other Southern European countries as well. Such patterns can be attributed not only to these nations’ economic structure or geographical location, but also to their immigration policies. A discrepancy between planned legal inflows and the society's actual needs (Finotelli & Sciortino 2009; González Enríquez 2009; Triandafyllidou 2009; Peixoto, Sabrino & Abreu 2009) caused Spain to resort to regularisation on an individual basis. Meanwhile, in addition to Italy, Spain and Portugal have also passed frequent regularisations, indicating that illegal back entry is a viable alternative.