To summarize, the purpose of this book was to examine the logistic influences on the design, conduct and outcome of British operations in the Burma campaign between 1942 and 1945. It set out to achieve this aim by identifying the principal logistic problems at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare; examining how those problems were addressed and assessing the impact on operations of the measures taken to overcome them. Part I established that, in May 1942, following the fall of Singapore and Burma, the main logistic challenges were the suitability of India as the strategic base of operations; the capacity of the operational LofC; and, at the tactical level, the lack of effective means to sustain forces cut off or manoeuvring away from fixed LofC in the jungle. All these problems were aggravated by lack of resources. Part II examined developments in these areas between May 1942 and early 1944. At the strategic level, it showed how India grew from a weak economic base sustaining an army of 180,000, employed principally on home defence duties, into one of the leading producers of warlike stores in the British Empire, providing armed forces of over 2 million people, every one of them a volunteer, and able to sustain on her soil an allied ground force equivalent to 16 divisions, as well as 86 air squadrons, all in addition to her own garrison. The strain of achieving that brought her domestic economy to the point of collapse. India had not been prepared at all for the role she had to assume after the fall of Singapore and Burma. Her defence posture faced west and, until the start of the Second World War, had been established only for internal security and to repel minor external aggression. She had not been expected to be a strategic base, that role in South-East Asia and the Far East having been given to Singapore.