The submarine defies neutral sentiment. To its advocates, it constitutes a cheap but effective counterthreat to superior surface forces, the weapon of the poorer against the richer power. The brotherhood of submariners often views itself as a “private navy,” hides its arcane mysteries from outsiders, and defends in every sense its “silent service.” To adversaries, the submarine is an unfair and unsportsmanlike weapon, a weapon of piracy and barbarity. Both positions appeared as early as the Hague Conference in 1899; Germany, Britain, and Russia were willing to ban underwater warships – albeit, on condition of universal prohibition, but France and the United States refused to abolish what they considered the cheapest means available to reduce British naval superiority.

Karl Lautenschläger has identified five general principles that govern the use of submarines in naval warfare. First, underwater warships possess no inherent immunity against countermeasures. Although they are difficult to find and largely invulnerable while submerged, submarines are open to attack once they disclose their presence by attacking surface vessels. Second, navies have trouble integrating submarines into existing force structures and operational concepts. In most cases, navies have found it difficult to define a specific mission for the submersible.