Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- Acknowledgements
- References and abbreviations
- Map 1 The Terraferma in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
- Map 2 The empire da Mar
- PART I c. 1400 to 1508
- PART II 1509–1617
- 8 The historical role of the land forces 1509–1617
- 9 The wars
- 10 Government: policy, control and administration
- 11 The higher command
- 12 Manpower
- 13 Cavalry, infantry, artillery
- 14 Fortifications in the Terraferma
- 15 The defence of the maritime empire
- 16 The costs of defence and war
- Conclusion: the European context 1525–1617
- Appendix Infantry wages in the sixteenth century
- Select bibliography
- Index
16 - The costs of defence and war
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- Acknowledgements
- References and abbreviations
- Map 1 The Terraferma in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
- Map 2 The empire da Mar
- PART I c. 1400 to 1508
- PART II 1509–1617
- 8 The historical role of the land forces 1509–1617
- 9 The wars
- 10 Government: policy, control and administration
- 11 The higher command
- 12 Manpower
- 13 Cavalry, infantry, artillery
- 14 Fortifications in the Terraferma
- 15 The defence of the maritime empire
- 16 The costs of defence and war
- Conclusion: the European context 1525–1617
- Appendix Infantry wages in the sixteenth century
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
Rising defence costs at home and overseas – a larger permanent army in garrison and the modernization of fortifications – and the costs of precautionary mobilizations or of war itself were the only significant challenges to a central government expenditure normally restricted to housekeeping. An apparently steadily rising revenue could deal with gradual increases in the peacetime expense of army, defences and fleet, but it could contribute little if anything to the ‘extraordinary’ costs of war – a point to bear in mind when considering the relationship between army wages, revenue and ‘total’ expenditure hazarded in Figure 6. And as in the capital, so in the regional centres; toll and tax income was perceived on a tickover basis, give or take a modest surplus due to central government. Thus any escalation in costs relating to defence or war produced a psychological unease and a methodological (accounting, administration) shock.
Even the steady succession of campaigns up to 1530 did not lead to an orderly way of raising or accounting for the year's expenditure or anticipating the next. It was not until 1584, as we shall see, that Venice established a war-chest. A specific threat to counter, a specific treaty obligation to honour; these were met, in anger and distress, through expedience financing. Perhaps there is a reflection here of private financial dealings, based on the short-term contract, the temporary partnership, minimum insurance against contingencies.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Military Organisation of a Renaissance StateVenice c.1400 to 1617, pp. 461 - 484Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1984