The decline in the intensity of violent conflict and the consequent reduction in the use of state coercion in governance were important factors in the increasing political marginalization of the Indonesian armed forces after 2004. The end of the communal violence in Maluku, North Maluku, and Poso as well as the resolution of the Aceh conflict reduced the political intervention opportunities for the military and strengthened the hand of the civilian government. In addition, President Yudhoyono's openly declared preference for peaceful negotiations with separatists and other state dissidents left the proponents of repressive military action without much influence to pursue their cause. Sidelined by Yudhoyono at the beginning of his term, the most prominent conservatives in the armed forces had no choice but to keep a low profile and prepare for retirement. In the meantime, the leadership of the armed forces shifted to politically moderate officers with a strong dislike for appearances in the media, contrasting sharply with the publicity-seeking and controversial nature of the statements made by officers such as Ryamizard Ryacudu and Bibit Waluyo during Megawati's presidency.

But the improvement in the quality of democratic civilian control over the military after 2004 was not only related to developments within the armed forces and the lower intensity of violence in the regions. As argued in previous chapters, the level of conflict between key civilian groups plays a significant role in determining the extent of military interference in politics, with intra-civilian fragmentation typically allowing the armed forces to defend their institutional interests and shield themself from demands for reform. By contrast, broad consensus among civilian groups on the form of state organization and important policy issues often leads to the marginalization of the military from political affairs. In Indonesia, conflicts between major civilian forces had marked the transfer of power from Suharto to Habibie, assisting protagonists of the New Order to remain in government and extend their influence into the democratic era. In the same vein, fierce competition between civilian constituencies over the posts and resources of the new polity brought the state to the brink of constitutional collapse in 2001, with the military emerging from the crisis largely rehabilitated and with new self-confidence.