Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's election as president in 2004 marked, in many ways, the end of Indonesia's democratic transition. Naturally, the transitional process between 1998 and 2004 had been of an experimental character, resulting in political compromises, institutional improvisations, and ambiguous legal frameworks. The transition had also been marred by serious security disturbances, with several waves of communal violence reflecting the general instability of Indonesia's social and political fabric during that time. But many of these typical phenomena of political transitions began to phase out in 2004 and 2005, with new democratic procedures taking root and most of Indonesia's key institutions settling into their post-authoritarian functions (Aspinall 2005a). The first direct presidential election in Indonesia's history was a watershed in this regard, providing the head of state with a strong popular mandate — and thus much better prospects of serving out a full term than his predecessors, who had come to power either through Suharto's appointment (Habibie), an indirect vote that included non-elected legislators (Wahid), or a controversial impeachment process (Megawati). The new electoral mechanism at the national level was followed by similar innovations in local politics, with governors, mayors, and district heads directly elected from June 2005 onwards (Mietzner 2005). At the same time, the intensity of communal conflict declined, with even some of the most volatile areas returning to almost normal political conditions. Overall, the political process began to stabilize significantly after 2004, and Indonesia entered into the phase of democratic consolidation.

This book has argued that the quality of democratic governance and the level of conflict between civilian groups have a considerable impact on the extent of military involvement in politics and, more specifically, on the pace of military reform in transitional societies. Accordingly, given the improving stability of the political process after 2004, we should expect a significant decline in military participation in Indonesian politics and, corresponding to this, improved democratic civilian control over the armed forces. To a large extent, this has indeed occurred. Yudhoyono sidelined the most conservative elements in the armed forces, creating a degree of effective authority over the military that none of his post-Suharto predecessors had been able to achieve.