The theory developed in this book is a wide-ranging one, with applications to many other issues in the philosophies of mind and action. If folk psychology does require a two-level framework of the sort outlined, then many existing debates will need re-evaluation. The framework will require new distinctions, permit new explanatory strategies, and cast old problems in a new light. There should also be implications for psychology and cognitive science. In this final chapter I shall briefly consider three areas in which supermind theory may have application: akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority. In each case my aim will be modest. I shall not attempt to survey the literature or to argue for the superiority of my approach, but confine myself to sketching the application of the theory and briefly indicating how it can resolve some of the puzzles associated with the phenomenon in question. The discussion will also include some remarks on the nature of intention. I shall close the chapter with a section outlining some possible applications of supermind theory in scientific psychology.

AKRASIA

Akrasia and self-deception are a pair of puzzling phenomena. Though apparently common, they seem to involve the violation of some basic norms of rationality, and it is not obvious how a unified intentional agent could suffer from them. They also present a special challenge to those who take an austere view of the mind.