Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-17T20:49:18.920Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - The gold standard as a commitment mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2011

Michael D. Bordo
Affiliation:
Rutgers University
Finn E. Kydland
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University
Tamim Bayoumi
Affiliation:
International Monetary Fund Institute, Washington DC
Barry Eichengreen
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
Mark P. Taylor
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
Get access

Summary

Introduction

The gold standard has been a subject of perennial interest to both economists and economic historians. Attention has focused on three aspects of the gold standard's performance: as an international exchange rate arrangement; as a provider of macroeconomic stability; and as a constraint on government policy actions.

The balance of payments adjustment mechanism, or the links between the money supplies, price levels, and real outputs of different countries under fixed exchange rates, has long been studied as the key aspect of the international exchange rate arrangement of the gold standard. The durability of fixed exchange rates, the absence of exchange market crises, and the smooth adjustment to the massive transfers of capital in the decades before 1914 have been features stressed in monetary reform proposals ever since.

The gold standard has often been viewed as ensuring long-run, though not necessarily short-run, price stability via the operation of the Classical commodity theory of money. Recent comparisons between the classical gold standard and subsequent managed fiduciary monetary regimes suggest, however, that the record is mixed with respect both to price level and real output performance.

Finally, the gold standard has also been viewed as a form of constraint over monetary policy actions – as a form of monetary rule. The Currency School in England in the early 19th century made the case for the Bank of England's fiduciary note issue to vary automatically with the level of the Bank's gold reserve (“the currency principle”).

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×