INTRODUCTION

At several points in the preceding discussion, I have toyed with the idea that a realist can dismiss objections that appeal to radical moral disagreement by arguing that the parties to such disputes really talk past each other. In other words, they can insist that when one of the parties says that an action is permissible and another denies this, they are not really contradicting each other, since “permissible,” for them, refers to different properties. In spite of its perhaps striking counterintuitiveness, some writers of a realist inclination have in fact made this move. They have argued that, given certain plausible ideas about meaning and belief attribution, the extent of genuine moral disagreement is exaggerated.

Many antirealists go along with this. That is, they agree that, under certain circumstances, ethical sentences express different beliefs for different speakers. However, they deny that this conclusion strengthens the realist's position. On the contrary, it seriously weakens it, and the reason is, precisely, that it does commit realists to regarding many moral disagreements as merely verbal. In their view, such an implication is absurd, which is shown by the fact that many of the relevant disputes will still exhibit the appearance of a genuine conflict. They conclude that, to have a genuine moral disagreement is not to accept conflicting propositions, and to have a moral conviction is not to have a belief. This argument – “the argument from ambiguity” – provides the focus of the present chapter.