INTRODUCTION

A philosophical analysis of political reconciliation should diagnose how relations are damaged during civil conflict and repressive rule, and should specify how political relationships should be rebuilt. My discussion in this chapter sheds light on some of the institutional dimensions of political reconciliation. I argue that one important source of damage to political relationships stems from the absence or erosion of the rule of law. A primary task of processes of political reconciliation, I claim, is to cultivate mutual respect for the rule of law.

The rule of law specifies a set of requirements that lawmakers must respect if they are to govern legally. As such, the rule of law restricts the illegal or extralegal use of power. When a society rules by law there are clear rules articulating the behavior appropriate for citizens and officials. The rule of law structures political relationships insofar as legal rules determine their particular contours. When the requirements of the rule of law are respected, the political relationships structured by the legal system constitutively express the moral values of reciprocity and respect for moral agency. The rule of law is instrumentally valuable, I argue, because in practice it limits the kinds of injustice that governments could pursue. Thus the erosion of the rule of law is morally concerning and damaging to political relations, insofar as it entails an erosion of important conditions for relationships to express reciprocity and respect for agency, and creates an environment conducive to injustice.